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After the first oil shock in 1974, the French 
government decided to expand the country’s 
nuclear power capacity and today France 
derives about 75% of its electricity from nuclear 
energy, with 59 nuclear reactors in operation, 
using a Westinghouse pressurized water 
process.  
And there are many questions: should we close 
the oldest nuclear power plants? How to 
dismantle them? Will the wind and solar 
energies be enough to meet future demand? 
What about the costs? What about the nuclear 
waste? Should we go on and invest in 3rd 
generation nuclear generators? 
Whatever the orientations chosen by the 
Nuclear Policy Council, one element remains 
crucial: the security of existing nuclear power 
                     








































plants. Often nuclear opponents and NGOs 
such as Greenpeace   point to the 
vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants and 
recall the memory of Chernobyl and 
Fukushima. Every time, the State authorities 
and the manufacturers answer that all 
necessary measures are taken to prevent 
threats and avoid accidents. Dialogue is 
difficult, on the one hand because enormous 
financial interests are at stake and lobbies on 
both sides are powerful and well organized, on 
the other hand because a number of measures 
taken to ensure the safety and security of 
nuclear settlements are to be kept secret while 
our fellow citizens demand transparency. Due 
to the lack of information the citizen think 
government is hiding something. 
Illegal Drone Overflights 
In this context, a new phenomenon appeared in 
2014. Between Oct. 5 and Nov. 13, workers or 
bystanders at 13 nuclear plants operated by the 
French electricity firm EDF reported to have 
heard in the sky, at night, engine noises similar 
to that of lawn mowers and to have seen red 
and green flashing lights. They said to have 
spotted several unidentified drones having been 
flown over the sites sometimes for a few 
minutes, sometimes longer, sometimes with 
repeated passages. On the evening of October 
19, and again on October 31, simultaneous 
drones were seen at sites hundred miles apart, 
which suggest a coordinated action by a group 
of people.  
The majority of these suspicions remained 
unconfirmed: there was no precise pictures of 
these flying objects, there was no physical 




helicopter flights carried out following the 
warnings. And it has since been established 
that some situations had a rational explanation. 
On October 19, at Gravelines, it was a small 
urgency medical aircraft which was authorized 
a usually forbidden direct flight towards a 
nearby airport. At Cattenom on October 14, due 
to the fog, aircontol changed the normal 
approach route to Luxembourg airfield and an 
airliner overflew the plant at the exact time 



































Figure 1: Documented illegal Drone overflights 
But on the contrary, some illegal over flights 
were truly documented. At Golfech, 
Gendarmerie was able to follow a drone by car 
from the ground for several kilometres before it 
disappeared. Finally, of the 37 initially counted 
flights over nuclear facilities and some others 
sensitive installations, violating the law, 19 have 






































These information produced a large 
psychological effect and triggered considerable 
discussion by the media and the public: was it a 
campaign of harassment by the nuclear 
industry’s opponents, in line with previous 
regular attempts of intrusion by activists inside 
civilian nuclear installations? or was it a test on 
security by some terrorist group in relation with 
the Middle-East French policy against Islamic 
state, two years after the attack at the In 
Amenas gas plant in Algeria?  Could a drone 
carrying explosives cause substantial damage 
to a nuclear power plant? 
Operators in the Energy sector and the State 
authorities could not remain silent.  
The first official organization to react was the 
Parliamentary Office for Scientific and 
Technological Assessment which organized two 
hearings on November 24th, one being 
classified, and the other opened to media. 
Representatives from the Civil Aviation Agency, 
the Nuclear Safety Agency, the Atomic Energy 
Commission, the ministry of Defense, the 
ministry of Interior, drone manufacturers, 
managers of unmanned aircrafts associations, 
many others were invited to advice on the 
current situation. Among them, Greenpeace 
France, an organization which had attempted  
several times in the past to illegally  penetrate 
nuclear facilities but denied any links to the 
recent flights. As early as mid September, 
Greenpeace had commissioned an engineering 
cabinet based in London, John Large and 
associates, to report on possible assault 
scenarios using drones. According to Large, the 




































  most of the nuclear power stations should be 
immediately closed. Jonh Large explained that 
a drone could hit the distribution grid serving 
the plant, making it dependant on its diesel 
generators to cool the reactor; then the 
generators could be taken out by another drone 
with a relatively small explosive payload. 
Even if these scenarios have been challenged 
by many experts, and the operator EdF has 
specified that the overflights had had no 
consequence on the security of the plants, it 
remained that no one knew who was behind 
these flights and what was the exact nature of 
the flying objects. How then could we ensure 
that France was not facing a potential risk? 
That is why the prime minister instructed the 
National Defense and Security General 
Secretary to review the security of sensitive 
industrial installations and present him with 
proposals to allow a more effective fight against 
the malicious use of drones. Until May 2015, 
NDSGD conducted an in-depth situation 
analysis and presented the Parliament in 
October 2015 with a report which developed 
along three pillars: 
(1) An assessment of risks and threat 
made by the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy 
(2) What was to be done in the legal 
field with the  adaptation of existing 
legislative and regulatory provisions, 
under the authority of the Ministry of 
Interior 
(3) Finally the development of a counter 
drone capability, based on 





































                    
neutralization, entrusted to the 
Minister of Defense 
 
Figure 2: Development of Civilian Drones in 
France: Challenges and Possible Responses 
from The State2 
The objective was to better act against 
malicious acts, which in France is part of 
Nuclear Security, together with Nuclear Safety, 
radiation protection and civil security actions in 
the event of an accident. 
Threat Assessment 
We need to consider the weapons and the 
targets. The first topic is the Drone (UAV) itself. 
What are we talking about?  
A UAV is an aircraft without any person on 
board, being remotely piloted (the aerial vector 
and the segment on the ground are then 
connected by data links) or being programmed 
 




































  to fly independently by GPS programmed route. 
It can be normally reused at the end of the 
flight. It carries a payload, being lethal or non-
lethal such as a sensor. We are confronted with 
two sorts of threat, military drones and outlaw 
civilian drones.  
• Drones developed for military 
purposes weight from a few 
kilograms to several tons, can fly 
between one hour and more than 
thirty hours, over distances that can 
range from 10 kms to several 
thousands kms. They require  
considerable investment, a high 
technical level and a complex 
logistic chain. Only a handful of 
countries have such large drones 
(HALE, MALE or TACTICAL) in their 
arsenal.  
• The proliferating threat is made up 
of small size civilian drones, mini or 
micro (one or a few kilograms), 
flying some 30 minutes, traveling a 
distance of 1 or 2 kms, which cost 
some thousands Euros. The vast 
application of the civilian drones 
consist of aerial shots with airborne 
cameras with a WiFi downlink to a 
mobile control and image viewing 
device. Those Drones are flying at 
very low altitude, without means of 
identification. The battery-powered 
drones, propelled by three or even 
four eight horizontal rotors can 
remain stationary and carry out 
narrow maneuvers. Their load 
capacity is generally 5 to 10 kgs, 





































transported in the trunk of a car and 
the process for launch may last only 
minutes. They are not subject to 
drastic rules for their acquisition and 
can be easily bought on line. They 
constitute a threat which is difficult 
to identify and virtually undetectable 
by the radar network deployed by 
the Air Force. 
To undermine the security of a sensitive site, 
one can follow three courses of action:  
• aggression, the purpose being to 
inflict damages to the installation 
using explosives for example, 
something similar to IED 
(Improvised Explosive Device) 
• espionage, in order to detect onsite 
vulnerabilities, even if drones 
cannot provide radically new 
information compared to available 
data and satellite sources, or to spy 
in real-time on guard procedures, 
• sort of psy-ops operations such as 
claimed intrusion by Greenpeace 
militants in the past, aimed at 
undermining the confidence placed 
in the protection of the sites. 
Whatever the purpose, terrorists will find with a 
drone all the characteristics they seek: a low 
cost unnoticed flying device bringing a payload 
without endangering a pilot. They may adapt an 
Unmanned Aerial System through modifications 
of commercially available models with 
additional components, and then use it to 
monitor a site, fly over fences to deliver 
weapons to the bad guys inside or place 




































  the security gates and checks. The criteria the 
small UAS must meet are range, mass of 
payload and agility of flight.  
Let us now consider the targets. The energy 
sector is one of the 12 sectors of vital 
importance identified in a 2006 ruling, along 
with Food – Electronic communications 
information systems – Space and Research – 
Water management – Transportation and so 
on. As such the energy sector is subject to 
special protection measures for all or part of its 
activities, facilities and production systems. 
For each sector, a National Safety Directive 
describes the threats, identifies the generic 
vulnerabilities and lists the measures to 
implement depending on the level of the threat. 
The operators use the NSD as a framework to 
develop their security policy. Then, the vital 
operator – there are 233 of them,  in this case 
Electricity of France – identifies the points of 
vital importance within its production system 
and proposes specific protection plans for each 
of its vital points, with measures of prevention 
and reaction. These plans, which are classified, 
set up how public forces articulate with the 
operator’s security personnel when a threat 
materializes. The drone issue is just one more 
specific issue.  
The critical nuclear infrastructures have been 
designed and dimensioned to withstand 
particularly severe external aggressions such 
as large-scale earthquakes or accidental 
aircraft crash. Modern nuclear reactors are able 
to withstand the impact from an airliner, the 
containment tank being made of 40mm steel 




than 1000mm of reinforced concrete interlaced 


































These potential aggressions, using drones as 
vectors, would not necessarily aim at creating 
the conditions leading to a nuclear accident.  
There may simply intend to destabilize the 
energy production system. One critical issue is 
to maintain the cooling system of the 
radioactive fuel located in the reactor but also in 
the deactivation pool. A simple rupture of pipe 
or a breach in a fuel pool may oblige to stop the 
production of the plant.  
 
Figure 3: Threat Assessment 
But from the threat assessment process, it 
emerged that micro or mini drones do not 
constitute real threatening aggressive devices 
because of their limited autonomy, their 
reduced carrying capacity and their difficult 
maneuverability in densely occupied areas. 
Even if most of the flights remained 




































  rule out accidental over flights, these incidents 
seemed to be more provocative and challenge-
like activities and the risk associated was 
considered very low. 
However, the difficulties encountered by police 
and judicial authorities in identifying and 
punishing the perpetrators gave the impression 
that they were powerless to respond to what 
can evolve in the future – the post 2020 period -  
towards a more real and dangerous threat. 
Hence the decisions on enforced regulations 
and counter drones capacities. 
Law and regulations  
The need to work on new rules is obvious 
because the use of drones that was once 
reserved for the armed forces has been 
growing in the public. Drones, which are 
remotely piloted aircraft, are regarded by the 
law as conventional aircraft. They are therefore 
subject to the same flight bans in certain areas, 
and violation of these provisions exposes 
offenders to the same penalties. Since 2012  
the pilots of ‘leisure drones’ must pilot at sight, 
within a maximum altitude of 150 m As far as 
the Nuclear power stations are concerned, any 
overflight of these installations at less than 
1000 meters of altitude and within a five-
kilometer zone around the power station is 
prohibited.  
Since 2009, the specialized platoons of the 
gendarmerie (PSPG), responsible for the 
security of the Critical Nuclear Plants have 
arrested 156 people during intrusion attempts, 
mostly by environmental extremists. There is no 
criminal offence specific to illegal intrusion into 





































is prosecuted on the same basis as intrusion 
into a single house. The offender risks up to 
one year in prison and 45,000 Euros in fines. 
But an analysis of judiciary decisions shows 
that the prosecuted persons are sentenced to 
light penalties, therefore not very dissuasive.  
Investigations have shown that a large 
proportion of illegal over flights were carried out 
by people who were unaware of the drones 
regulations. Regulation must evolve towards 
greater responsibility of tele pilots to reduce the 
number of risky behaviors and malicious uses.  
At the same time, one must make sure that an 
economically dynamic sector is not strangled by 
new regulations.  
Several proposals have been raised on the 
strengthening of the legal framework for the 
protection of nuclear installation, notably the 
possibility for local homeland authorities to 
regulate the movement and parking of vehicles 
within a radius of 5 kilometres around the 
installations (ruling n°2014-792 du 10 July 
2014).  
Then in October 2016 the parliament passed a 
law on increasing the safety of the use of 
civilian drones, which will be fully implemented 
in 2018. This law creates the offence of 
overflying prohibited areas listed specifically, 
including nuclear power plants. The law now 
sanctions the use of drones in these areas, "by 
clumsiness or negligence", with up to six 
months in prison and a fine up to 15,000 Euros.  
If their mass exceeds 800 grams, drones 
should be equipped with a light fleshing device, 
an electronic signalling device and a capacity 




































  specific training and know the conditions of use 
related to aerial navigation. Additional 
measures might be considered in the future, 
such the installation onboard drones of a 
transponder which obliges to give the position 
in the airspace or of a “chip” allowing remote 
deactivation by the law enforcement forces.  
At the EU level, recommendations were issued 
on November 10, 2016 by the transport 
committee of the European Parliament asking 
the EU to finalize regulations covering oversight 
of the operation of unmanned aircraft systems 
in civilian airspace. The European Commission 
would be responsible for drafting safety rules 
for the design and operation of drones, 
including situations in which additional systems 
are required to limit their altitude or access to 
sensitive sites. It would also establish 
procedures for registering and marking 
unmanned aircrafts.  
The control of nuclear risks is made of two 
complementary approaches that have their own 
logic : Safety and Security which generally have 
two different meanings (Ref IAEA Glossary):  
Safety, i.e. prevention of accidents, is mainly a 
technical issue while Security, i.e. prevention 
and detection of malicious acts is mostly 
connected with intelligence. From the hearings, 
it appeared that coordination of safety and 
security issues is essential. There can be no 
dissociation of the two subjects. 
The question of safety is governed in a clear 
way. The Nuclear Safety Authority, which is an 
organization independent from the government, 
establishes the safety requirements and verifies 
that the operators, of whom safety is the 





































Intervention in the event of an accident is the 
responsibility of the operator EdF and the 
specialized nuclear services.  
On the security side, since 2009, EDF’s 20 
civilian nuclear sites are under the protection of 
specialized gendarmerie protection platoons 
(PSPG). The number of gendarmes per site 
varies from about forty to fifty, with specific 
equipment and training. Their task is to 
neutralize a terrorist threat as defined by the 
national safety directive for the nuclear sector. 
In case of intrusions, their priority mission is to 
regroup around the points of vital importance of 
the site in order to secure them, and not to 
prosecute non violent militants. Only when all 
risks to the point of vital importance are 
removed that intruders can actually be 
apprehended.  
As far as Drones are concerned, the action of 
Gendarmerie is not isolated. The law 
enforcement action in airspace and compliance 
with no-fly zones is under the responsibility of 
the Air Force National Air Operations Center. 
Actions can go as far as the destruction of a 
threatening aircraft. The High Authority for Air 
Defence (HADA) under the direct authority of 
the Prime Minister contributes to the 
compliance with the Civilian Aviation Code 
regulations, in particular with regard to the 
overflight of prohibited areas. The mission 
requires robust coordination with numerous 
bodies: police, gendarmerie, customs, the 
Civilian Aviation Agency, the airlines and air 
clubs, the centralization of all information and a 
decision making in a single place. The 
coordination tool is the SGDNS and intervention 




































  the government, the Gendarmerie and the Air 
Force.  
Even if one wishes to mix the Safety and 
Security functions, it is impossible to question 
the sovereign prerogatives of the State which is 
the only one authority empowered with the 
employment of Police and Military forces. So 
the future lies in greater on site coordination 
between the two structures, an integrated 
decision making process and a larger public 
communication through An existing but 
underused dialogue body called the High 
Committee for Transparency and Information 
on Nuclear Safety (HCTISN).  
Counter drones capacities  
All the 2014 hearings highlighted also the need 
for the Services that have responsibility for 
airspace security and public safety to be 
equipped with the appropriate means to more 
easily detect malicious uses, identify the 
devices involved and their telepilots and, where 
appropriate, neutralize those aircraft before 
they cause damage. .  
The GSDNS provided 1M € funding to increase 
the research effort, particularly on detection. 
Small aerial drones are slow, fly low and are not 
metallic. Given their small Radar Equivalent 
Surface (SER) detection is to be based on a 
combination of various means such as passive 
radars and acoustic. Audio allows a panoramic 
pre-detection; then it is possible to aim with a 
video to determine in a smaller angle what we 
are dealing with. Some years ago, the Franco-
German AVALON project, which means 





































video methods, was developed by the Franco-
Research Saint-Louis Institute.  
For the neutralization, one can imagine passive 
countermeasures such as passive protection of 
the targets with nets or smoke or jamming 
techniques, either data link jamming or jamming 
the GPS, making the drone blind, and active 
counter-measures such as kinetic defenses and 
laser defense systems with option of blindness 
of the sensors.  
Three projects which are built of known 
“technology bricks” were supported in 2015 and 
2016 by the National Research Agency :  
• The ANGELAS project combining 
active and passive radar, 
radiogonometry and also acoustic 
detection will identify the flying 
object through high-resolution 
camera and create an electronic 
bubble that will jam the radio link 
between the suspect drone and the 
radio controller 
• The BOREADES project which uses 
a combination of optics and 
electronics to identify the target 
• The SPID project which focuses on 
the same technological assets but 
has the particularity of being 
installed in a vehicle and being able 
to be deployed in less than 30 
minutes.  
From a live presentation organized on 
November 18 2016, we concluded that it is 
easier to spot a small drone than to neutralize 




































  without a radio link; and interfering with the 
GPS link can induce collateral effects on many 
users. If the drone is destroyed by kinetic 
action, the debris can hurt people or damage 
installations when falling on the ground. The Air 
force announced it had acquired eagles 
capable of intercepting and neutralizing drones 
in sensitive areas (4 royal eagles). Police in the 
Netherlands have been training bald eagles to 
intercept small drones from some years. 
Of course, France is not the only nation 
threatened by malicious drones. In the United 
States, Michigan Tech University developed a 
drone interceptor that catches a drone by 
dropping a net. Others methods are envisaged 
such as jets of water mixed with others 
components. In Israël, Rafael Advanced 
Defense Systems unveiled in April 2016 the 
Drone Dome, a system which uses radar and 
cameras to detect and track the movements of 
drones flying in prohibited areas and then 
disrupts their electronic systems, thereby 
ending. 
Conclusion 
Today, the French authorities speak of ‘a real, 
emerging and evolving threat” which will 
become a very common one after 2020 and 
that we should neither dramatize nor downsize. 
Nuclear plants are not likely to be the most 
worrying targets in terms of damages when 
compared with airports for example. But as 
soon as we talk of nuclear, some kind of 
paranoia raises into public opinion. For the 
future, the challenge remains to detect who are 
the potential aggressors before they act through 
a difficult homeland intelligence process and 





































for the neutralization of a drone, an action  that 




1. NDSGD report, October 2015. 
 
